, and he proposes an ethical framework for asking questions about representation. This article argues that we might begin this critical engagement by inaugurating a jurisprudence of sensitivity, where 'sensitivity' is a concept recognised by law as justifying limits upon representation or disclosure. Once probative value has lapsed, and cultural value is ascribed to some items of criminal evidence, this article shows how a 'sensitive jurisprudence' might make us attentive to the potential harm done by retrieving this material from crime's archive. 
I. Perverting the course of justice
This article opens with a case study with the aim of illustrating one instance in which criminal evidence captures the imagination of both legal and cultural users. Henry
Bond's book Lacan at the Scene (2009) represents an instance in which photographic evidence taken for a criminal investigative purpose is re-used for a cultural theoretical enterprise. Whereas the original material is already violent, profane, and violates crime's victims, this article argues that Bond's re-use is insensitive, for the way it reifies transgression, and does so without adequate justification. Nevertheless, Bond's endeavour highlights a new range of concepts and questions which, despite a growing cultural hunger for criminal archival materials, have failed to be addressed by the legal institutions which create and preserve these records.
Researching his book Lacan at the Scene, Henry Bond visited the British National
Archive and sought access to English murder case files between 1955 and 1970. He was looking for files which contained original crime scene photographs. The cases he examined had been 'solved' in the judicial sense -the perpetrators of these homicides had either pleaded guilty or they were convicted following a trial. However, Bond had the idea that the photographs in the files contained further 'clues' which, when subjected to Lacanian readings, would enable him to diagnose the perpetrators as neurotic, psychotic or perverse. clothing in a humiliating state of disarray, her handbag on the seat above her. Bond imagines the 'quasi-intimacy' of the train compartment, and speculates that the woman was a 'seemingly flirtatious stranger', and provocatively describes this crime as an 'inversion' of 'the romantic notion of the chance encounter with a stranger on a train' (Bond, 2009: 53) . He writes, 'finally these strangers did form a lasting relationship, but only as perpetrator and deceased' (Bond, 2009: 53 ).
Bond's analysis is not interested in rape and murder; it is in the visual representation of these crimes' effects in the crime scene photographs. He notices that, in the photographs, the victim's 'skirt [is] pulled up to reveal underwear, stockings, garter, and so on' (Bond, 2009: 53, 57) ; the description is gratuitous as the photographs he reproduces spare none of these details. Bond spends the rest of his analysis of this case examining graffiti scratched on the door of the train compartment, reproduced in his third photograph. He describes the graffiti, variously, as 'obscene/erotic' (Bond, 2009: 57) , as 'erotic/obscene' (Bond, 2009: 58) , as a depiction of 'gang rape' (Bond, 2009: 57) , as 'violent rape' (Bond, 2009: 58) , and as 'the residue of a perverse act' (emphasis in original) (Bond, 2009: 57) . He is interested in the 'exhibitionistic dimension' of graffiti, and wants to 'creat[e] a dialogue' between the drawing and the murder scene, both of which he describes as 'depictions' of a 'similar fantasy scenario' (Bond, 2009: 57 (Bond, 2009: 58) .
This concludes Bond's analysis. He moves swiftly on to his next violent sexual homicide 'investigation', accompanied by further abject, humiliating and -franklyheartbreaking crime scene photographs. Bond's book is not consigned to the 'cult/alternative' genre, as has applied to other books he identifies and which are characterised -just as his book is -by their prurient and possibly perverted fascination with rape and murder (Bond, 2009: 26 (Bond, 2009: xv) .
In Lacan at the Scene, both Bond and Žižek inexplicably, 'cannot really accept' -that these photographs do represent 'actual events'; they represent aggravated sexual assaults, intimate-partner homicides, and murders by strangers, almost of all of which are perpetrated upon women. The author, editor and publisher have forgotten that the reality and gravity of these crimes demands sensitivity, and they have collaborated in displaying the violated corpse of each woman repeatedly, cruelly and without any reflection upon the trauma she has suffered (Bond, 2009: 37-8 is that it has provoked these questions, some of which this article begins to address.
Several of the book's reviewers do not share my concerns: Daniel Hourigan, who noticed that the book was a 'sometimes gruesome read' and that the photographs were 'abject depictions', nevertheless concluded that the images 'always remain objects of a most critical and tasteful engagement' (Hourigan, 2010) . Similarly, Owen Hewitson conceded the book's 'disturbing content', but believed 'Bond is careful […] to be sensitive to his subject matter and to avoid any hint of the callous voyeurism or noir pastiche that is a familiar cliché of the detective fiction genre' (Hewitson, 2011: 109-111) . Neither reviewer explains how photographs of real rape and murder might be displayed in a 'tasteful' or 'sensitive' mode. Whereas the heft of this volume derives from the truth of these images -they really are probative of rape and murder -its reviewers go to some effort to show that these images might be experienced theoretically. Bond himself engages in some meretricious taunting of his readers on this issue. He asks: 'Do you not, gentle reader, feel a little dirty as you browse the lurid images? You may also notice that my version of this conscious justification is that I present the photographs as part of a Freudo-Lacanian study' (Bond, 2009: 197 footnote 104, emphasis in original). In her review, Margaret Kinsman represses her own revulsion: 'Although still very hard to look at -they are, quite frankly, gruesome -with the passage of time, these photos have acquired a historical patina that distances one from how they show the events they depict' (Kinsman, 2010: 116) ; repressing affect with critique, she then describes Bond's writing as 'stimulating, creative and unsettling in an interesting manner. His approach evokes a kind of aesthetic pleasure, which unsettles even as it satisfies' (Kinsman, 2010: 116) . In her review, Viola Brisolin -who briefly raises the charge of Bond's own voyeurism before acquitting him of itoverstates his scholarly achievements here: 'Bond's rigorous method and resolute approach'; his 'deft … moves' and 'skilful interpretations'. Brisolin refers to the raped and murdered women as 'The objects depicted in these images' (Brisolin, 2011: 672) .
Like the book's other champions, including Žižek, and his dust-jacket patrons, Victor
Burgin, Bruce Fink and Dylan Evans, some of the book's reviewers seem to have been beguiled by Bond just as, for Lacan, the pervert and his audience are drawn into a symbiotic mutuality.
Of course, these women are not now, and never were, objects, and their relocation from criminal case files into cultural theory is, for this reader, neither tasteful nor sensitive.
Lacan at the Scene takes criminal evidence, initially gathered for the purpose of investigating and prosecuting homicide, and puts it to a gruesome new purpose. Bond repeatedly remarks upon the bewilderment of the archivists he confronted, and his frustration at their attempts to place restrictions upon his requests to access these files, suggesting emphatically that these bureaucratic philistines are impeding his crucial theoretical endeavour. Among those Bond thanks in his 'Acknowledgements' is Luc
Sante, who probably inaugurated the practice of making coffee-table books out of crime scene photographs, with his books Low Life and Evidence (Sante, 1992 (Sante, , 2003 . Bond cites several other books in this burgeoning genre (Bond, 2009: 197 footnotes 104, 106) , and he explains that his book originated in his Ph.D research in a UK university (Bond, 2009: 203 footnote 53) . And so, whilst Bond's project represents for this reader the comprehensive failure of administrative, scholarly and ethical standards to prevent the post-trial mis-use of criminal evidence -nobody stopped him; some cheered from the sidelines -his is not the only work in which criminal evidence has re-appeared in a cultural setting, with troubling consequences. One aim of this article is to highlight the difficulty of distinguishing those re-uses which are mis-uses without some guidance about how one might exercise sensitivity within crime's archive. It also needs repeating that lawful uses might, in some accounts, also constitute mis-uses.
II. Cultural uses of crime's archive
Bond is just one in a flourishing field of artists and other creative and scholarly practitioners whose work draws upon official records, but who aims to put these materials into fresh, often unanticipated, contexts. Some of this work is shocking, for instance in its graphic displays of sexual violence and homicide (see Biber, 2010) , its wilful aggravation of the traumatic circumstances from which it arose, (see Scott Bray, 2011; Biber, 2006a; Biber and Dalton, 2009c; Birmingham, 2012) or for the illicit means by which it was obtained by its creative users (see Biber, 2011c ). Some of this work actively interrogates the implicit logics of the archive from which it was recovered (Jones, 1986 see Biber and Dalton 2009; Biber, 2011a Shadows, 2006; Doyle, 2005 Doyle, , 2009 see Biber 2006b see Biber , 2011b Maley, 2007; Safe, 2011; Crerar, 2012) . Some of this work grapples with the accusations of voyeurism that arise when one looks without permission (Hanrahan, 1999 The socio-legal discourse of 'open justice' and the cultural-political discourse of 'transparency', have emerged concurrently with a broader cultural sensibility, one that has been called the 'archival turn' (Stoler, 2002: 87, 95) , the 'archival impulse' (Foster, 2004) , and 'archive fever' (Derrida, 1995 (Whitelaw, 2011) .
Courts and legal archives have yet to resolve their processes for permitting post-trial access and use of their records. In the absence of any formal rules, guidelines or legislation permitting access to, and use of, criminal evidence, knowledge about decision-making and actual use of this material is anecdotal and arbitrary.
Within the visual arts through the 20th century, the archive had been the site of repeated return by artists confronting history, historicity, order, linearity, time and bureaucracy.
Artists including Christian Boltanski, Joseph Beuys and Gerhard Richter used archival fragments in an attempt to memorialise the past (see, for example, Buchloh, 1999 Giftset, 1998; Prada Deathcamp, 1998) and Alan Schechner (It's the Real Thing -SelfPortrait at Buchenwald, 1993) , who played with alternate-endings or aesthetic aspects of the Nazi Holocaust (Biber, 2009a) , and for which they and other artists were accused of 'toxic narcissism' (Schjeldahl, 2002: 87) , 'sheer stupidity' and were 'not to be forgiven' (Kramer, 2002 ('History Painting, Shopping Mall 15:42:32, 12/02/93, 1993-4; 'History Painting', Railway Line, 1993-4) , which were heavily criticised by Bulger's family and the exhibition's sponsors (Cusick, 1994; McGrath, 2004 themselves on the fringes of the museum' in a relationship that is self-reflexive, critical or ironic, or where archival institutions actively collaborate with artists in this manner, the artistic potential for archival resources is, she concludes, 'boundless and uncontrollable' (Stanhope, 1999: 8-9 . See also Photofile, 2005 and Source, 2012) .
For artists, but also for lawyers, journalists, publishers, curators and scholars, the document in the archive has the attributes of authenticity, contemporaneity, and the unique tangibility of a real moment captured in material form. These attributes form the basis for the strict interpretive limits imposed by the rules of evidence and criminal procedure. These rules, of course, cannot hope to contain the other attributes of the archival document, those that make it so irresistible as the basis for creative work:
beauty, violence, surprise, shame, volume, and the promise that it contains an irresistible secret.
III. Open justice and its exceptions
Where criminal evidence leads a cultural afterlife, we find the intersection of two secrets' acknowledges that public records sometimes demand tact or sensitivity about the secrets they contain (see Sedgwick, 1993; Biber and Dalton, 2009c; Young, 2011) .
This delicate balance arises in other legal contexts and is reflected in the need to regard certain disclosures as 'privileged' or 'protected', and where the benefit or interest in disclosure is weighed against the benefit or interest in restriction. It is a balance that has been criticised in instances where legal proceedings have continued despite some of the evidence been kept 'secret' from one of the parties (Biber, 2009b; Kumar, 2011) . And it is a balance that was recently attempted, without success, in New South Wales (NSW), is not defined. In the United States, however, there is a presumption of access to all public records, achieved through freedom of information legislation, but drawing upon principles said to pre-date the Constitution and with origins in the English common law (Conley et al., 2011: 772-847 , but see also 787, footnote 63, reference to Zenith Radio).
Whilst a 'legitimate interest' in the public record must generally be demonstrated, Conley et al, explain the considerations that might apply where access is limited:
'safety, stigma, shame, unfair disadvantage, and reputational damage' (Conley et al, 2011: 826) . Where the identity of rape victims is involved, further grounds for restriction might include 'the negative judgment of their communities, and chilling effects' (Conley et al., 2011: 825) . In the United Kingdom, open justice principles have recently been confronted by proposals to expand the range of processes which allow for secret evidence to be adduced, known as 'closed material procedures', taking the extraordinary measures developed in a counter-terrorism context and applying them more broadly in some civil and coronial proceedings (Scott Bray and Martin, 2012) .
The Act takes a very limited approach to terms such as 'private', 'personal' and 'sensitive' and has not applied nuanced scholarly attempts to carve out a private realm in public or online spaces (Nissenbaum, 1998 (Nissenbaum, , 2004 (Nissenbaum, , 2010 . In the work of Helen Nissenbaum, for instance, she distinguishes intrusions by certain (usually state) agents from intrusions into private or personal spaces, and also -relevantly -intrusions that arise 'when the information in question meets societal standards of intimacy, sensitivity or confidentiality' (Nissenbaum, 2004: 128) . By focusing upon the integrity of the information in its own context, Nissenbaum proposes that we can recognise 'norms of information flow' within that context (Nissenbaum, 2004: 137) , and that privacy violations will occur where contextual informational norms are transgressed (Nissenbaum, 2004: 138) .
IV. Proposing a jurisprudence of sensitivity
Whether some of the cultural re-uses of crime's archive constitute 'transgressions' might be resolved by developing a jurisprudence of sensitivity, within a socio-legal discourse of 'openness' and 'secrecy' (Young, 2011: 57-74) . This article calls for further work in this direction, and itself represents a preliminary setting-out of the issues at stake.
'Sensitivity' is a concept recognised by the laws and practices dealing with information management. Where information is stored or governed by public agencies, rules and guidelines attempt to manage the flow of that data: between or within agencies, between agencies and individuals, across borders, or otherwise. In jurisdictions where freedomof-information functions presumptively, there are limited categories which function as exceptions to this presumption of openness. Whilst terminology varies, in general these exceptions include: privacy, personal information, health records, protected confidences, trade secrets, disclosures against the public interest, or matters of national security. Where an exception applies, the information might not be disclosed, or it might be edited or redacted before disclosure. Usually, where information is disclosed, it must be disclosed unconditionally. It is evident that, whilst the concept of 'sensitivity' is recognised by law, it is a limited one and, contrary to ordinary understandings of the word 'sensitive', it attempts to be sensitive only to considerations within a limited list. I propose that a jurisprudence of sensitivity places pressure upon the existing legal concept of 'sensitivity' in order to bring it within the broader ambit of a sensory jurisprudence; that is, a jurisprudence connected with the senses, perceptible by the senses, endowed with the faculty of Oxford English Dictionary, 2000 -).
Both legal and cultural enterprises are capable of sensitivity, and this capacity offers a pathway through the potentially dangerous or harmful space in which criminal evidence continues to survive after the expiry of its probative value. Sensitivity offers an alternative to the underlying binaries at stake here -open/closed, public/private, transparency/secrecy -which, when pressed, turn out to be pointless or false.
Criminology could achieve a timely intervention into a dialogue that has begun within cultural and political theory, following Clare Birchall's position that 'secrecy or transparency?' is a false choice (Birchall, 2011a) , and that we live with the tensions and contradictions between these positions (Birchall, 2011b) . propose with the term 'sensitivity' -explores the literary and rhetorical moves by which 'judgment' is reached when there is no 'right answer' (Manderson, 2010: 496) .
For Manderson, justice is not found in the judgment as decision but in the doubt and challenge from which it resulted: the process. But Manderson identifies the significance of 'justification, reason-giving, and resistance' as characterising the process of judgment, and he opposes the view of judgment as 'closure and finality' (Manderson, 2010: 513 (Pisa, 1999) . Footage showed Gills hit an elephant 12 times with a metal bar, shouting 'You'll never learn'. Another report said that, after chasing an elephant around a small cage, Gills shouted, 'I don't f***ing listen to you. F***ing c***, you're going to get it right across the f***ing earhole' (Armstrong, 1998, expurgation in original) . Elsewhere, he was shown hitting elephants with a broom, shovel and pitchfork (Carter, 1999) . He was also shown hitting a chicken's head against a wall (Watson-Smyth, 1999) . The director of Animal Defenders, Jan Creamer, told the BBC: 'Steve Gills said it was because he was depressed and he took it out on the animals' (Storer, 2002) . Gills was sentenced to four months in prison for animal cruelty. In yet another bewildering twist, in 2007 a newspaper reported that Gills, by then a pensioner, had been assaulted by a group of youths after his ex-girlfriend had spread rumours that he was a convicted paedophile.
He told reporters, 'I pass people in the street and they look at me as though I'm a bit of dirt. They all turn around and stare' (Crawley Observer, 2007 It is not only a legally-oriented perspective on criminal evidence that feels troubled by post-trial uses of crime's archive. This is a debate within the creative arts as well. David
Campany, a photographer and scholar, has urged that engagement with this sort of artwork ought to establish a nuanced critical standard, one which recognises that photographic use, re-use and mis-use has always been a source of anxiety: 'rather than collapsing into an easy relativism in which any reading is as good as any other there is an understanding that a reflexive knowledge demands we include the archival within the frame rather than leaving it outside' (Campany, 2003) .
Thinking sensitively might offer a promising way through the darker territory in which criminal evidence sometimes dwells after the conclusion of proceedings. Establishing a conceptual and ethical practice that recognises sensitivity gives crimino-legal scholars critical tools for responding to this cultural work. Rather than excluding the work altogether -as not art, or unfit for display -a better dialogue might emerge from the place where our fascinations co-exist. Criminal conduct, and its investigation and proof, have long been viewed through a cultural lens, and this lens can reflect back upon evidentiary doctrine. Cultural interventions upon criminal evidence help us understand how the rules of admissibility, exceptions, prohibitions and protections -collectivelyrepresent sites of sensitivity and confidence within legal discourse. A legal rule-bound approach to evidence closely guards concepts such as 'relevance', 'reliability', 'firsthand', 'remote', 'prejudice', 'unfair', 'improper', 'danger', the distinction between 'fact' and 'opinion', the distinction between a 'tendency' and a 'coincidence', the distinction between 'testimony' and the 'credibility' of the witness who gives it, and the special status of the criminal accused. Further, the law creates separate rules for evidence in the form of a 'witness', a 'document', or a 'real' evidence. These are categories that do not survive as distinct within the cultural field, and so law's distinctions demand scrutiny. Approaching these concepts culturally might disclose how narrow and contested are law's fact-finding processes, and how vulnerable these might be when situated outside the protective ambit of evidentiary rules.
A cultural framework reminds the evidence scholar that, whereas questions of admissibility are determined on an in/out basis -evidence is admissible or it is excluded -more troubling and fascinating are the processes of reasoning with evidence.
Following the interventions into the field made by William Twining, who cautioned against a focus on rules and urged an examination of the spaces between fact and value, fact and law, reason and intuition (Twining, 2006: 7) , we can also see the potential for cultural perspectives to assist us in remaining sensitive to the ways we attribute worth or weight to evidence. It is at this level of evidentiary discourse that a cultural lens might focus; here is where decision-making is most fragile and uncertain, where the processes behind judgment reside and are concealed. 
